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Due to rapid diagnosis and isolation of imported 
cases, community outbreaks of viral haemorrhagic 
fevers (VHF) are considered unlikely in industrial-
ised countries. In March 2016, the first documented 
locally acquired case of Lassa fever (LF) outside Africa 
occurred, demonstrating the disease’s potential as 
a cross-border health threat. We describe the man-
agement surrounding this case of LF in Rhineland-
Palatinate – the German federal state where secondary 
transmission occurred. Twelve days after having been 
exposed to the corpse of a LF case imported from Togo, 
a symptomatic undertaker tested positive for Lassa 
virus RNA. Potential contacts were traced, categorised 
based on exposure risk, and monitored. Overall, we 
identified 21 contact persons with legal residency in 
Rhineland-Palatinate: seven related to the index case, 
13 to the secondary case, and one related to both. The 
secondary case received treatment and recovered. Five 
contacts were quarantined and one was temporarily 
banned from work. No further transmission occurred. 
Based on the experience gained during the outbreak 
and a review of national and international guidelines, 
we conclude that exposure risk attributable to corpses 
may currently be underestimated, and we present sug-
gestions that may help to improve the anti-epidemic 
response to imported VHF cases in industrialised 
countries.
Introduction
On 25 February 2016, a healthcare professional with 
a rapidly deteriorating health condition, was evacu-
ated from Togo to Cologne, North Rhine-Westphalia, 
Germany, where he died of multiple organ failure 
within hours of hospital admission [1,2]. After an 
autopsy [3], the corpse was released from the hospital 
and transferred to a mortuary in Rhineland-Palatinate, 
where he was meant to be embalmed before repatria-
tion to Togo. Six days after releasing the corpse, tis-
sue samples that had been sent to the World Health 
Organization (WHO) Collaborating Centre for Arbovirus 
and Haemorrhagic Fever Reference and Research at 
the Bernhard Nocht-Institute for Tropical Medicine in 
Hamburg for further diagnostics tested positive for 
Lassa virus (LASV) [1]. As a result, contact tracing was 
initiated in all federal states of Germany where individ-
uals might have been in contact with the patient while 
he was still alive or with his corpse.
Lassa fever (LF) is a viral haemorrhagic fever (VHF) 
caused by Lassa virus (LASV) – an enveloped, sin-
gle stranded RNA virus belonging to the family of 
Arenaviridae. The incubation period ranges from 3 to 
21 days [4]. Disease onset is characterised by unspe-
cific, influenza-like symptoms. Signs of increased vas-
cular permeability, such as haemorrhages, oedema, 
and shock, indicate severe LF [5]. Symptomatic treat-
ment of LF comprises fluid replacement and antipyretic 
drugs. Intensive care is required for the management 
of severe LF. The nucleosid-analogon ribavirin inhib-
its viral replication and its early administration was 
shown to improve survival of patients with LF [6]. Its 
prophylactic use may be considered after exposure 
with high or very high risk of infection [7]. Due to the 
high proportion of inapparent and mildly symptomatic 
infections, overall mortality of LASV infection is ca 1%, 
but increases to 18–31% for cases that require hospital 
care [8,9]. There is currently no vaccine to prevent LV 
infection.
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LASV is endemic in West Africa [10]. It is mainly trans-
mitted via excretions of rodents, either by direct 
contact with the mucosae or breached skin, inges-
tion of contaminated food, or inhalation of contami-
nated dust. Its natural hosts are multimammate rats 
(Mastomys natalensis), which do not develop symp-
toms, but can excrete the virus for an extended period 
of time. In endemic regions, reported LASV sero-
prevalences in rodents range from 5% to 45% [11,12]. 
Distribution of the natural host is a strong determinant 
of LASV endemicity [10]. To date, human cases of LF 
have been reported from Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte 
d’Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Mali, Nigeria, and 
Sierra Leone [10], where the population prevalence of 
LASV-specific IgG antibodies ranges from 14% to 44% 
[13,14]. Community outbreaks of LF are mainly fuelled 
by zoonotic transmission. For nosocomial outbreaks 
however, person-to-person transmission of LASV via 
bodily fluids is particularly relevant [15,16], and super-
spreading events have been described [16].
Importations of LF cases to industrialised countries 
are generally rare, but could become a more common 
cross-border health threat considering increased con-
nectivity to endemic countries. Although imported LF 
cases through international travel and repatriation 
have been reported from – among others - Germany, 
the United Kingdom (UK), and the United States (US) 
[17-21], there has been no report of secondary cases 
following the import to non-endemic parts of the world.
The Ebola virus disease (EVD) epidemic struck West 
Africa in 2014, and imported cases were reported 
from various industrialised countries. This illustrated 
the need for VHF outbreak management capacity to an 
unprecedented extent. The subsequent activities to 
Figure 1
Timeline of events related to the Lassa fever outbreak, Rhineland-Palatinate, Germany, 2016
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scale up preparedness led to the compilation of vari-
ous EVD outbreak management guidelines in Europe 
[22-25].
In Germany, there are two documents addressing the 
outbreak management of VHF: recommendations cov-
ering the outbreak management of VHF in general (pub-
lished in 2001) [26], and another document addressing 
EVD in particular (triggered by the outbreak in West 
Africa and issued in March 2016) [22]. Both provide 
guidance and best practices with regard to diagnos-
tics, treatment in dedicated facilities, biosafety, waste 
disposal, disinfection, logistics, contact tracing, risk 
classification, control measures, and post-process 
evaluation.
Here we describe the events surrounding a locally 
acquired case of LF outside of Africa and report the 
challenges we faced with regard to contact tracing and 
enforcement of control measures in the federal state 
of Rhineland-Palatinate. We then review national and 
international VHF guidelines to identify complementary 
information of value for managing VHF outbreaks in the 
respective setting. We also present suggestions that 
may help improve the anti-epidemic management of 
imported cases of VHF in Germany and Europe.
Methods
Contact tracing, exposure risk classification 
and management
Upon information about the laboratory confirmation 
of LV in the index case, we contacted the embalming 
contractor, on whose premises the corpse of the index 
case (IC) was stored, and asked for a list of employ-
ees and everyone else who could have been in contact 
with the corpse. We then followed up all potentially 
exposed individuals. For rapid initial assessment and 
due to time constraints, we conducted ad hoc inter-
views by phone, using a short standardised question-
naire to estimate the individual extent of exposure. 
Individuals reporting or suspecting having had contact 
to the corpse, to a potential symptomatic case, or to 
their bodily fluids, were considered contact persons 
and classified into risk categories according to the 
German VHF recommendations ([26],  Box). We used 
the day of first exposure plus the minimum incubation 
period of 3 days as the earliest time point to produce 
secondary cases, in case symptom onset of a LF case 
and thus the beginning of the period of infectiousness 
could not be clearly discerned.
We initiated passive symptom monitoring of all con-
tacts in the risk categories I-III. We asked them to 
report their body temperature and the occurrence of 
any symptoms by email or telephone every 12 hours for 
the maximum incubation period of 21 days post-expo-
sure to the LF case. Depending on the assigned risk 
category, enhanced control measures were enforced 
(Table 1).
Measures included 21 days of active symptom moni-
toring, temporary work ban, home/hospital quaran-
tine, and/or isolation, post exposure. Other measures 
included PCR-diagnostics and post-exposure prophy-
laxis with ribavirin. For contacts who developed suspi-
cious symptoms, a more cautious set of measures was 
applied. In some instances, this required individual 
Table 1
Control measures for contacts of viral haemorrhagic fever cases, as used during the Lassa fever outbreak in Rhineland-
Palatinate, Germany, 2016a
Exposure risk /Control measure

























Symptom monitoring  +  +  +  +  +  +  +  +
Home quarantine NA * - - NA NA * *
Quarantine/isolation in hospital  +  * - -  +  + * *
Post exposure prophylaxis  +  * - -  +  + * *
Blood sample at baselineb  +  + - - NA NA NA NA
PCR diagnostics for LASV + - - -  +  +  +  +
Temporary work ban, high risk professionsc  +  + * -  +  +  +  +
Temporary work ban, any profession  + * - -  +  + * *
 +: measure is recommended; -: measure is not recommended; *: measure to be considered on individual basis; LASV: Lassa virus; NA: not 
applicable.
a Measures based on reference [26].
b For diagnostic testing, in case symptoms develop or disease progresses.
c Professions with close physical contact to people (hospitals, schools, etc.); subject to individual decision.
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review and decision making by a panel of experts in 
infectious diseases and public health.
After the first assessment, we conducted in-depth 
interviews of ca 30 minutes each, using a more quali-
tative approach with open questions. We started with 
contacts for whom initial underestimation of exposure 
risk was suspected, based on inconsistencies or miss-
ing information when triangulating information gath-
ered during the ad hoc assessment. The interviewees 
were talked through the exposure incident and asked 
to describe the exact type and proximity of contact. 
The purpose of these interviews was to fill informa-
tion gaps, clear inconsistencies, and identify further 
contact persons, but also to discuss the possibility for 
unconscious exposure, such as touching potentially 
contaminated surfaces or material. Based on our in-
depth interviews, we re-assessed initial risk classifica-
tions and respective control measures (Table 2).
Symptom monitoring and control measures
We enforced control measures according to German 
VHF recommendations [26] (Table 1). However, these do 
not explicitly specify which symptoms other than fever 
justify a more cautious set of measures. Therefore, we 
added other symptoms of interest as sore throat, rhi-
nitis, headache, cough, other respiratory symptoms, 
mucosal bleeding, myalgia, arthralgia, and gastro-
intestinal symptoms. We defined fever as oral, rectal, 
or tympanal body temperature ≥ 38.0 °C. The assess-
ment of contacts was complicated by the seasonally 
high prevalence of influenza-like illnesses in March 
that lowered the already limited specificity of symp-
toms used to indicate potential LF. Therefore, in low 
risk contacts (III), we defined either fever or a reported 
progression in the intensity of non-febrile influenza-
like symptoms (i.e. sore throat, headache, cough and/
or rhinitis) over 4 days as the trigger for additional 
measures. Contacts with high or medium exposure risk 
(I-II), by contrast, were subject to enhanced measures, 
regardless of symptom progression, as soon as any of 
the above mentioned symptoms occurred. If indicated, 
genome level-informed [27] reverse transcriptase quan-
titative PCR from blood was performed at the biosafety 
level (BSL) 4 laboratory at the Institute of Virology, 
University of Marburg, to confirm LASV infection.
Review of existing VHF guidelines
We searched governmental, European Union (EU), and 
WHO online resources for publicly accessible English 
and German language VHF/EVD guidelines of relevance 
for contact tracing and management in Europe. We 
reviewed the respective outbreak management sec-
tions for particular strengths and common gaps, and 
highlighted key points with potential benefit for the 
outbreak management following imported VHF cases.
Ethical considerations
The events around this first LF outbreak outside Africa 
received wide media coverage. All details of identifi-
able subjects described in this work have been previ-
ously released into the public domain [1,2,28,29].
Table 2
Results of exposure risk categorisation based on ad hoc compared with in-depth interviews with contacts from a Lassa fever 
outbreak, Rhineland-Palatinate, Germany, 2016
  Contacts








  Nurse evacuated from Togo, died in 
Cologne, transferred to mortuary in 
Rhineland-Palatinate
  NA   NA   NA
  Contact 1 / 
secondary case
  Handled corpse of IC with double 
gloving, no facial mask, no apron
  III
  Autopsied corpse of IC that was losing 
massive amounts of fluid; potential contact to 
contaminated surfaces or objects after ungloving
  II
  Contact 2
  In same room as IC but no direct 
contact; work-related contact to C1
  III
  Potential contact to contaminated surfaces 
(door handle, sink) in room where C1 handled IC
  II
  Contacts 3–8
  Team transporting corpse of IC to 
crematory; full personal protective 
equipment (BSL-4 equivalent)
  III   No safety breach reported (upon probing)   III
  Contacts 9–12
  Potential exposure to bodily fluids 
of C1
  Ib   No additional information obtained   Ib
  Contact 13   Travelling in a car with C1   III
  No contact to corpse or potentially 
contaminated surfaces; no direct contact to C1
  III
  Contacts 14–18   Visitors to C1   III   No additional information obtained   III
  Contacts 19–21
  C19 physical contact to C1 without 
personal protective equipment
  II
  Interviews with C19 led to identification of C20 
and C21; had contact to C1 at onset of symptoms
  II
BSL: biosafety level; C: contact; IC: index case; NA: not applicable.
a According to viral haemorrhagic fever recommendations [26].
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Results 
Contact tracing, exposure risk classification 
and management
The autopsy results were not available until 6 days 
after the arrival of the corpse at the mortuary. By 
the time the PCR-positive test result was communi-
cated, the embalmment had not yet been performed. 
However, two employees of the mortuary had poten-
tially been exposed to infectious material. One con-
tact (C1), an undertaker using double gloving but no 
facial protection and apron when handling the corpse, 
was classified as a risk category III contact in the ini-
tial rapid assessment. However, during the in-depth 
interviews we learned that the autopsied corpse had 
started to decompose and had lost large amounts of 
fluid when being handled. Talking C1 through this set-
ting again, direct contact to bodily fluids could be 
excluded. However, considerable uncertainty about 
contact to contaminated surfaces after ungloving 
remained. Therefore, we re-classified C1 into risk cat-
egory II (Table 2). The other contact (C2) was present in 
the same room as C1, but had no contact to the corpse 
(risk category III). Later during the outbreak investiga-
tion, similar doubts about having touched potentially 
contaminated surfaces as in the case of C1 arose. 
Hence, we also re-classified C2 from risk category III 
into II.
Two days after discovering the index case was LASV-
positive, his corpse was transferred for cremation by 
a team in full personal protective equipment (BSL  4 
equivalent). We classified them as risk category III con-
tacts (C3–8) according to the VHF recommendations 
[26].
At the time of exposure to the corpse of the index case, 
C1 was recovering from an upper respiratory tract infec-
tion [1]. His condition worsened 4 days after handling 
the corpse. On day 6 post exposure, the LASV-positive 
test result of the index case was communicated to the 
health authorities. Being in risk category II, this war-
ranted a home quarantine (from day 7 post exposure, 
onwards) and PCR-testing for LASV, although C1 had no 
fever at the time. On day 8 post exposure, the nega-
tive PCR test result of C1 was communicated. As symp-
toms of C1 still persisted, a second blood sample was 
taken. This tested PCR-positive for LASV on day 12 post 
exposure [27]. On the same day, the health status of 
C1 deteriorated and he was transferred to the isolation 
ward of Frankfurt University Hospital for treatment with 
ribavirin [29]. The patient fully recovered after 21 days 
in isolation.
At the time C1 tested positive for LASV, his deterio-
rating health justified the classification of those with 
likely exposure to his bodily fluids (C9-C12) into risk 
category Ib. We identified seven additional contacts to 
the secondary case, of which six (C13-C18) were clas-
sified into risk category III, and one (C19) into risk cat-
egory II. Futhermore, in-depth interviews allowed us to 
trace two further contacts of C1, unnoticed previously 
(C20 and C21, both risk category II).
In total, we identified 21 contact persons with legal 
residency in Rhineland-Palatinate, Germany (Table 2): 
seven with contact only to the IC, 13 with contact only 
to the secondary case, and one contact with expo-
sure to both cases. Compliance of all contacts during 
follow-up was high and we had no loss to follow-up. 
No further transmission occurred and the outbreak was 
declared over on 6 April 2016.
Symptom monitoring and control measures
In total, nine contacts developed non-febrile influenza-
like symptoms, particularly cough, rhinitis, and/or sore 
throat. Six of them were high or medium risk contacts 
(category Ib/II), and underwent PCR testing for LASV 
with negative results. High risk contacts (category Ib) 
were quarantined, offered post-exposure prophylaxis 
Table 3
Strengths in VHF/EVD management guidelines relevant to Europe, 2016
Area of guidance Strength Example
Trigger for control measures
Comprehensive set of unambiguously defined symptoms, which allows taking reproducible 
decisions in favour of or against enforcing enhanced control measures
[22,24]
Exposure risk classification Classify exposure to corpses of individuals who died of VHF, as high-risk [22,23]
Personal protective 
equipment





Guidance and suggestions on how to conduct interviews [24]
Sexual transmission
Explicit mention of sexual transmission as an exposure risk (even after recovery) and how it 
can be avoided
[22-25,30]
Travel of contact persons Explicit mention of travel restrictions as a control measure for contacts [22,23,25,30]
Waste management Instructions for waste disposal and disinfection measures [22,30]
Information materials Provision of template information sheet for contact persons NA
EVD: Ebola virus disease; NA: not available; VHF: viral haemorrhagic fevers.
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with ribavirin, and discharged 21 days post exposure. 
One medium risk contact (category II) was quarantined 
at home and one was subject to a temporary work ban. 
The three low risk contacts (category III) were closely 
monitored, but did not show any progression to more 
severe symptoms. Hence, neither PCR-testing nor addi-
tional control measures were enforced. A timeline of 
the outbreak is provided in the Figure.
Review of existing VHF guidelines
In addition to the German VHF recommendations [26] 
used in the outbreak described here, we identified 
five guidelines of relevance: one concerning the man-
agement of VHF (UK) [30], and four concerning the 
management of EVD (Germany, European Centre for 
Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC), US Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) / WHO, and 
UK) [22-25]. Their approach is similar; first, an assess-
ment of the exposure risk of suspected contacts is con-
ducted. On the basis of the respective risk category 
and symptoms, control measures are enforced. In the 
context of the outbreak reported here, the review iden-
tified particular strengths but also gaps, which may be 
addressed in harmonised European guidelines for the 
management of VHF outbreaks in the future (Table 3).
Discussion 
In 2014, the EVD epidemic quickly spread across bor-
ders and continents. As a result, most countries, 
including Germany, scaled up their EVD preparedness 
with a focus on timely detection of imported cases, 
as well as their isolation and treatment at designated 
facilities. This approach is considered most feasible 
and effective in preventing outbreaks, as detection of 
imported cases is expected before person-to-person 
transmission occurs.
Here we presented the first secondary case of LF out-
side Africa, occurring in an undertaker in Rhineland-
Palatinate, after he came into contact with an autopsied 
corpse of a patient that had died from LF in Cologne, 
North Rhine-Westphalia, Germany. The abscence of 
similar cases and only one single published report of 
a physician seroconverting upon contact to a LF case 
[21] suggests that the overall risk of LF outbreaks trig-
gered by imported cases is very low. Nevertheless, 
these observations illustrate that LASV transmission in 
the community and consecutive outbreak management 
in industrialised countries can become a realistic sce-
nario. Being legally in charge of tracing contacts with 
residency in Rhineland-Palatinate, we faced a number 
of challenges that may also apply to similar settings in 
other countries, where VHF outbreaks in the commu-
nity are currently an underestimated threat.
In outbreak situations, particularly those involving 
VHF, prioritisation of tasks and adequate time alloca-
tion are paramount. Ad hoc interviews allow an initial 
rapid assessment and provide an overview regarding 
the magnitude of the outbreak. However, our findings 
show that in-depth interviews with targeted probing for 
high risk situations and behaviours are essential dur-
ing follow-up. These can lead to identification of further 
contacts and re-evaluation of initially assumed and 
potentially underestimated exposure risks. Interviews 
should also be employed to build trust between the 
investigators and the interviewees. Particularly in 
stressful situations, this will help enhance compliance 
and can thus be crucial for successful outbreak man-
agement. In this context, we considered the guidance 
provided by the CDC/WHO EVD management guide-
line [24] very helpful. For future guidelines, provision 
of template information material for contact persons, 
describing the disease as well as the rationale for con-
trol measures, would be welcome. Ideally, this material 
should be prepared together with experts in anthropol-
ogy and psychologists with the aim to reduce fear and 
maximise compliance. From our experience, it should 
also contain information on the use of antipyretics. 
These were commonly used to treat the common cold 
by contact persons in the outbreak reported here, but 
can blur the onset of disease, and through prolonged 
inhibition of platelet aggregation may turn out to be 
detrimental in case of severe LF.
Box  
Exposure risk classification of contacts to VHF cases, 
used in the Lassa fever outbreak in Rhineland-Palatinate, 
Germany, 2016a 
Very high risk (Category Ia)
• Subcutaneous contact or contact of a mucous membrane to  
bodily fluids or tissue of a VHF patient
High risk (Category Ib)
• Contact (skin or aerosol) to infectious bodily fluids/tissue of 
a VHF patient
• Contact to infectious bodily fluids/tissue/carcass of a VHF-
positive animal
Medium risk (Category II)
• Providing care to or handling diagnostic samples of a VHF 
patient
• Direct contact to potentially contaminated objects of a VHF 
patient
• Direct contact to the corpse of confirmed or suspected VHF 
case
• Contact to VHF-positive animal
• Close proximity to a symptomatic VHF case, e.g. during flight
Low risk (Category III)
• Any other contact to a confirmed VHF case (e.g. in same room 
with VHF case)
• Contact of medical staff to confirmed case using proper 
personal protective equipment (including respirators)
VHF: viral haemorrhagic fever.
a Translated from Fock et al. [26].
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This investigation documents a considerable LASV 
exposure risk through contact to an autopsied corpse. 
In current guidelines reviewed in this investigation, the 
classification of exposure risk emerging from corpses is 
heterogeneous – as high risk [22,23], medium risk [26], 
while not being explicitly mentioned in others [25,30] 
– indicating the need for future harmonisation. Death 
from LF/VHF is the result of endothelial damage, capil-
lary leak, shock, and multi-organ failure. Thus, corpses 
of patients that died of LF/VHF are likely to secrete flu-
ids from edematous tissues, irrespective of the level of 
decomposition or whether they had undergone autopsy 
or not. This is particularly true in case of intensified vol-
ume therapy, fluid-overload, and advanced decompo-
sition of the corpse – the latter of which was severe in 
our case. As the contact to corpses is thus associated 
with a high risk of being exposed to infectious bodily 
fluids, it would be helpful that harmonised guidelines 
classify contact to corpses of confirmed/suspected LF/
VHF cases without full personal protective equipment, 
as high risk exposure at any rate.
During this outbreak investigation, the assessment 
of symptoms consistent with LF was complicated by 
the concurrent peak of the influenza season. To limit 
psychological stress for the affected contacts and 
their families, we had to sensibly adapt the threshold 
triggering enhanced control measures, particularly 
isolation and quarantine. Human case reports have 
measured detectable viraemia in blood on day 3 of 
symptom onset, whereas earliest detection of LASV in 
urine was not until 6–22 days after developing symp-
toms [31,32]. Viraemia and infectivity correlate with 
severity of symptoms [32]. Hence, a patient without 
severe symptoms is unlikely to be infectious through 
casual contact, particularly within the first 4 days of 
infection. The common cold typically lasts for a week, 
but shows no progression past day 3 of onset. We 
therefore decided to closely monitor all low risk con-
tacts (III) that developed influenza-like symptoms, but 
no additional measures were enforced unless either a 
4-day progression or more severe symptoms (includ-
ing fever) occurred. For contacts with a high to medium 
exposure risk (I-II), any symptoms consistent with LF – 
even in absence of fever - triggered additional meas-
ures. Future guidelines may follow this example and 
employ a comprehensive operationalisation of how and 
when VHF-compatible symptoms/symptom progression 
trigger(s) control measures, with the goal to offer treat-
ment as early as possible to those with a significant 
exposure risk, while reducing unnecessary stress for 
the involved parties. Ideally, future recommendations 
would also elaborate on the anatomical location(s) 
for temperature measurement that the fever threshold 
applies to.
In summary, our report provides lessons learned that 
can be employed to improve the response to imported 
VHF cases. Complemented by the strengths identi-
fied through a comparison of relevant guidelines, this 
experience may be reflected in harmonised European 
recommendations for VHF outbreak management. In 
particular, we suggest classifying the exposure risk 
attributable to corpses of individuals that had died of 
a VHF as high. As part of VHF preparedness in indus-
trialised countries, more practical training of field epi-
demiologists in interviewing contacts and applying 
available tools for the classification of communal VHF 
exposure is needed.
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